Wednesday, November 23, 2005
Bosnia, Revisited ... And Getting Facts Straight
With the anniversary of the Dayton Accords and with the newest rage being to compare Bosnia and Iraq [full disclosure: not that I object to that, I did so myself several months back for a piece in the Examiner], the historian in me rises up at how easily people play hard and loose with the facts (or just accept someone else's spin).
A random example: one blogger referred to Bosnia as a "primarily Muslim state." That's flat out wrong. Bosnia is primarily nominally Christian in the sense that Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs together form an absolute majority (and using religion as an identifier can be tricky given that most are good secular Europeans regardless of their ancestral faith). Bosnia is "Muslim" in the sense that the Bosnian Muslims form a plurality in the population, traditionally were the majority in the major cities, and because Bosnia was the only South Slav region where indigenous Slavs converted to Islam en masse yet retained their Slavic language and culture (as opposed to being Turkified). Bosnia certainly cannot be classed as a Muslim country in the way that Iraq or Indonesia or Egypt is. And so to try and draw analogies (Bosnia is a Muslim country so its experience MUST be applicable to other countries of the Muslim world) is perilous.
Jackson Diehl's Washington Post column is another good example of trying to fit square pegs into round holes. The overall point I agree with--the need for patience, the need to build institutions, etc. But in his eagerness to make comparisons he goes a bit overboard. He equates Bosnia's Serbs with Iraq's Sunnis--perhaps in his desire to paint both with the brush of genocidal villainy--but the more logical comparison from the point of view of actual politics would be the Sunnis of Iraq with Bosnia's Muslims--both the "statist" nationality trying to rule over two other groups that did not accept their legitimacy to speak for the country as a whole. The Bosnian Serbs wanted not to dominate Bosnia but to take control of what they deemed Serbian land, expel non-Serbs to create facts on the ground, and leave the rest to be independent or be absorbed or dominated by Croatia (essentially the American plan in creating the Bosniak-Croat Federation in Washington in 1994)--they have had the least interest in Bosnia as Bosnia--much in the same way that many Kurds aren't really interested in Iraq south of Kirkuk or what happens in Baghdad. And of course the democracy crowd wants to forget that the nationalists who plunged Bosnia into civil war, including, I'm afraid, war criminal Radovan Karadzic--were ELECTED in elections in 1990 deemed to be "free and fair." It may be cute to call Karadzic and Mladic "insurgents" but again, if we fail to ignore how premature democratization in Bosnia helped to unleash civil strife, we learn the wrong lesson.
A random example: one blogger referred to Bosnia as a "primarily Muslim state." That's flat out wrong. Bosnia is primarily nominally Christian in the sense that Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs together form an absolute majority (and using religion as an identifier can be tricky given that most are good secular Europeans regardless of their ancestral faith). Bosnia is "Muslim" in the sense that the Bosnian Muslims form a plurality in the population, traditionally were the majority in the major cities, and because Bosnia was the only South Slav region where indigenous Slavs converted to Islam en masse yet retained their Slavic language and culture (as opposed to being Turkified). Bosnia certainly cannot be classed as a Muslim country in the way that Iraq or Indonesia or Egypt is. And so to try and draw analogies (Bosnia is a Muslim country so its experience MUST be applicable to other countries of the Muslim world) is perilous.
Jackson Diehl's Washington Post column is another good example of trying to fit square pegs into round holes. The overall point I agree with--the need for patience, the need to build institutions, etc. But in his eagerness to make comparisons he goes a bit overboard. He equates Bosnia's Serbs with Iraq's Sunnis--perhaps in his desire to paint both with the brush of genocidal villainy--but the more logical comparison from the point of view of actual politics would be the Sunnis of Iraq with Bosnia's Muslims--both the "statist" nationality trying to rule over two other groups that did not accept their legitimacy to speak for the country as a whole. The Bosnian Serbs wanted not to dominate Bosnia but to take control of what they deemed Serbian land, expel non-Serbs to create facts on the ground, and leave the rest to be independent or be absorbed or dominated by Croatia (essentially the American plan in creating the Bosniak-Croat Federation in Washington in 1994)--they have had the least interest in Bosnia as Bosnia--much in the same way that many Kurds aren't really interested in Iraq south of Kirkuk or what happens in Baghdad. And of course the democracy crowd wants to forget that the nationalists who plunged Bosnia into civil war, including, I'm afraid, war criminal Radovan Karadzic--were ELECTED in elections in 1990 deemed to be "free and fair." It may be cute to call Karadzic and Mladic "insurgents" but again, if we fail to ignore how premature democratization in Bosnia helped to unleash civil strife, we learn the wrong lesson.
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I think the most germaine part of Nichlas' comparison is of the Sunnis with the Bosnian muslims. Both are minority groups who wielded power over majority groups previously, but who are effectively neutered as a group in a democracy as long as voting continues along ethnic group divisions. This ugly past of ethnic power struggle poisons democracy and the prospect of a united Iraq in the future.
I think the argument contained within Nicholas' post is an important antidote to the idea that democracy and purple fingers will be a panacea for the ills of Iraq. The Sunnis certainly know that they cannot outvote the Shiites, thus fuelling the insurgency. The Shiites, in turn, have the power to crush the Sunnis with impunity. Democracy or not, this looks dangerously like the set-up for death-squads and ethnic cleansing.
There was a very worrying article in the WaPo in which Shiite forces call for more "leeway" in dealing with insurgents. And perhaps it's true that this extra "leeway" is what is needed to break the back of the insurgency -- but make no mistake -- it will mean brutal state-sponsored terror for the Sunnis. An ironic end for an American invasion that seeked to free the Iraqis from the brutal state-sponsored terror of Saddam.
I think the argument contained within Nicholas' post is an important antidote to the idea that democracy and purple fingers will be a panacea for the ills of Iraq. The Sunnis certainly know that they cannot outvote the Shiites, thus fuelling the insurgency. The Shiites, in turn, have the power to crush the Sunnis with impunity. Democracy or not, this looks dangerously like the set-up for death-squads and ethnic cleansing.
There was a very worrying article in the WaPo in which Shiite forces call for more "leeway" in dealing with insurgents. And perhaps it's true that this extra "leeway" is what is needed to break the back of the insurgency -- but make no mistake -- it will mean brutal state-sponsored terror for the Sunnis. An ironic end for an American invasion that seeked to free the Iraqis from the brutal state-sponsored terror of Saddam.
# posted by 
: 7:45 AM
: 7:45 AM
Thanks, anodyne and battlepanda, for your comments.
I think that a great deal depends on whether a group expects outside support or leverage versus having to cut a deal "at home." Sunni predominance in Iraq for the last eight decades rested on overt support from the British, the Americans, and the Arab world in general.
What will be interesting to see is whether, in the aftermath of the French riots, the EU continues to support Bosnian Muslim predominance in order to make the case that the EU is about to accept a "Muslim" state, especially if Turkey's accession process gets derailed.
The Kurds now, I think, are where the Serbs were circa 1840. The principality of Serbia then was an autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire yet had aspirations to eventually unite all Serbs into one state. I think for many Kurds autonomy in Iraq is likewise a first step.
Finally, on the points about ethnic politics. What I find frustrating here in Washington is how we fail to recognize how often ethnic politics in other parts of the world are not simply features of "generations of historical memory" or reflecting backwardness and ignorance, but are day to day survival mechanisms in places where states are weak, where the idea that services are provided to all citizens is not often put into practice, and where people want the security of a community beyond the extended family but don't feel that the "state" serves that function. It takes time for the state or for non-commmunal institutions to gain the levels of trust needed for people to move beyond ethnic politics--and even in the United States ethnic politics continue to play a role.
I think that a great deal depends on whether a group expects outside support or leverage versus having to cut a deal "at home." Sunni predominance in Iraq for the last eight decades rested on overt support from the British, the Americans, and the Arab world in general.
What will be interesting to see is whether, in the aftermath of the French riots, the EU continues to support Bosnian Muslim predominance in order to make the case that the EU is about to accept a "Muslim" state, especially if Turkey's accession process gets derailed.
The Kurds now, I think, are where the Serbs were circa 1840. The principality of Serbia then was an autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire yet had aspirations to eventually unite all Serbs into one state. I think for many Kurds autonomy in Iraq is likewise a first step.
Finally, on the points about ethnic politics. What I find frustrating here in Washington is how we fail to recognize how often ethnic politics in other parts of the world are not simply features of "generations of historical memory" or reflecting backwardness and ignorance, but are day to day survival mechanisms in places where states are weak, where the idea that services are provided to all citizens is not often put into practice, and where people want the security of a community beyond the extended family but don't feel that the "state" serves that function. It takes time for the state or for non-commmunal institutions to gain the levels of trust needed for people to move beyond ethnic politics--and even in the United States ethnic politics continue to play a role.
Sorry for the late response--don't know if you are still checking.
Officially, no one is pushing for Kurdish independence in DC, but remember that in 1999 very few supported independence for Kosovo either. RIght now substantial autonomy is the game plan. But remember that in so many of the political settlements--the peace deal in Southern Sudan, for one--the option is left open for separation at a later date.
I think some here hope for a kind of compromise solution: an independent Kurdistan in Iraq so the Kurds "get a state" but no changes of borders with regard to Turkey--sort of like a Hungarian state that doesn't encompass the entire Hungarian "nation."
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Officially, no one is pushing for Kurdish independence in DC, but remember that in 1999 very few supported independence for Kosovo either. RIght now substantial autonomy is the game plan. But remember that in so many of the political settlements--the peace deal in Southern Sudan, for one--the option is left open for separation at a later date.
I think some here hope for a kind of compromise solution: an independent Kurdistan in Iraq so the Kurds "get a state" but no changes of borders with regard to Turkey--sort of like a Hungarian state that doesn't encompass the entire Hungarian "nation."
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